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3.

Copy of text books written by members of the State Bar on
legal subjects;

4.

A set of the Supreme Court Reports;

5.

Journals, reviews and publications appertaining to government,
legislation and the administration of justice;

6.

Other publications along lines of political, moral and social
science, international law, constitutional law and law reform as
individual members may desire to make.

The letter suggests that the books be dedicated on the front page in
the handwriting of the donor, and sent parcel post prepaid to the address above given.

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
The Hon. William Draper Lewis, answering the question propounded following his address to the West Virginia Bar Association,
namely, "What will be the force and effect of the restatement of the
law?" said this: "We believe that the restatement will be the agency
that will tend to unify the common law. If it doesn't do that, then we
have thrown away our time. We believe that it will lead through the
training of new men as lawyers in the training schools and by the use of
it in the courts in their decisions, to a very much more uniform use of
legal language. I have been asked a question slightly analagous at
other bar meetings: What is a judge expected to do, for instance, in the
Supreme Court, when a case comes before him and the Institute says one
thing in regard to the law and a recent decision says the other. There
is only one answer: They follow their recent decisions, unless they are
so far convinced that it is absolutely wrong that they would change
them anyhow. I don't think the Institute will ever get to a position
where a court would, after a recent decision, 'wabble' because the restatement came out in a different way. But remarkably few cases of
that kind are going to exist because we are never making a statement
where the recent cases in the United States are all against us or the
great weight of authority is against us. We are always making the
statement that will be naturally followed by the great majority of
courts."
To the question, "Is it expected that the restatement will be adopted
by the states ?" Mr. Lewis replied: "We have no desire-and I will put it
the other way-we are very desirous that no legislature will think of
adopting this restatement. We are not codifying the law in the sense
of producing a statute. We believe in the common law system and we
want to preserve that flexibility of the common law, and if you are going
to make the restatement of the law a legislative code you are going to
destroy the common law system, and no matter how good the code is and
the millions of dollars we spend on it, it will be only in a few subjects and
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would be doing more harm than good by having it adopted. This may
be true: Unless the judges take an interest in it while it is being done,
unless they follow it, in a sense, because it is theirs and the bar's after
it is done, and this confusion which exists today grows worse, then the
public will force us to get out a legislative codification. It is, however,
a codification of the common law in the sense that it is an orderly formal
statement of the common law."
"In ten years, or fifteen," he added, "I think we can confidently say
that all the main subjects, at least the subjects we have now undertaken,
will be completed. Contracts or agency will probably be completed in
five or six years."
NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
Corrington vs. Crosby-A judgment or order of a district court in
Montana, declaring a banking corporation to be insolvent, and levying an
assessment on the stockholders generally, is conclusive on stockholders
in this state, though they were not parties to said action nor served with
process therein. A creditor of an insolvent banking corporation, domiciled in Montana, may, on behalf of himself and all other creditors, institute and maintain, in this state, a suit against stockholders resident
herein, to recover their added statutory liability without first having his
claim reduced to judgment.
Gilmore vs. Olson-On motion for dissolution of an attachment upon
several grounds, one among them being non-ownership of the attached
property, which moving party supports by his own oath, such ground for
dissolution and its proof can be disregarded as mere surplusage, but
should be given its legal effect, which is to preclude such party from
relief under such motion upon any ground stated therein.

Walrod vs. Nelson-Actual knowledge of the entry of a default
judgment satisfies the statute with respect to notice.
Party cannot
deduct from period of statute of limitations applicable to his case the time
consumed by the pendency of an action in which he sought to have said
matter adjudicated, but which was dismissed without prejudice to him.

